Introduction
Traditionally general practitioners have responded to a request for advice and treatment on a problem from the patient or a patient's relatives. Increasingly, however, they are becoming concerned to avoid morbidity rather than simply respond to it'. Many papers and reports have discussed the opportunities for preventive action in general practice, and have proposed schedules for screening and policies for health edu-cation2. Since about two-thirds ofthe population consult their general practitioner every year3, the use of routine consultations has been advocated as an efficient way of promoting prevention'.
However, this approach has been criticized by others who denigrate health education as nothing but propaganda5 6 , and hold that it is an abuse of their role and an infringement of patient autonomy for general practitioners to engage in such activity7. Which of these views is acceptable? 0141-0768/87/ 080502-03/$02.00/0 1987 The Royal Society of Medicine Arguments in favour The argument generally proposed in favour of general practice as a suitable setting for health promotion is based on the assumption that the purpose of medical activity is to minimize illness and prolong life. This is most efficiently done, not by treating illness when it presents, but by acting earlier to avoid it arising or to seek it out before symptoms occur. In terms of maximizing wellbeing and minimizing illness amongst a practice population, this makes excellent sense. For example, it has been estimated that half of all strokes and 25% of all myocardial infarctions could be avoided by the modification of known risk factors2. Smoking alone claims 100 000 lives per year8. Whilst a few patients come to their doctors seeking advice on the prevention of illness, and more will take up opportunities for screening if they are offered, a large proportion (including some of those most at risk) are not reached by such methods9. For this reason the use of the opportunity provided by routine contacts initiated by patients to discuss smoking, diet or exercise, or to encourage them to take up services such as cervical smears, blood pressure checks or immunizations, has been advocated.
If we judge it solely by its consequences for the patient's health, there is little doubt that such opportunism is justified. For example, Russell et al.'0 found that following a brief discussion of smoking together with a health education leaflet, 5% of those consulting their doctors for other reasons had given up smoking and remained non-smokers after one year. They argued that all general practitioners should adopt this policy since it would lead to half a million ex-smokers per year. Their argument was based solely on the desirable outcome of such a policy, and did not consider patients' rights or doctors' duties at all.
The argument for such 'opportunistic' health education can thus be summarized as follows:
(1) General practitioners should do what they can to maximize their patients' health and longevity.
(2) Anticipatory care and changing to a healthy lifestyle are efficient ways of doing this.
(3) Therefore general practitioners should engage in anticipatory care and promote change to a healthy lifestyle.
Arguments against 'Opportunistic' health care implies a change of philosophy. Instead of a general practitioner's list of patients being seen as people to whom she or he has a duty to provide services when asked to do so, it becomes a population for whom the doctor has a responsibility to minimize illness. Ethically, this may be thought of as a shift from a model based on concepts ofduty to one based on the potential outcome of an action. It means that the agenda for the consultation is no longer set by the patient alone, but also by the doctor.
Although patients are not actually physically compelled to have cervical smears taken, there is no doubt that it is harder to opt out of discussing smoking habits or obesity when this is introduced into a routine consultation, than it is to ignore the services of special screening clinics when these are offered. Indeed, this is the point ofit. Is this justified, or is it an infringement of the patient's autonomy?
Zander7 seems to believe that it is the latter. He argues that health education should be restricted to laying before the patient in an impartial way the facts of the case, and that patients should then make up their own mind. Accordingly, the success of health education should be judged by changes in knowledge, not changes in behaviour. Skrabaneks argues that moving from curative to preventive activity is a shift in philosophy: he attacks this as a move from science to social engineering. These criticisms, I believe, merit careful consideration. In particular, at a time when patient choice, patient participation and patient autonomy are being seen as important values, we should consider carefully any suggestion that we are eroding them. Also, some of the resistance to implementing health promotion programmes in general practice may come from ethical beliefs such as these, and not merely from lack of time or apathy. The principal arguments which need to be addressed are: (1) The shift from the 'treatment on demand' model to the 'maximizing health' model of general practice is an unwarranted medicalization of areas in which doctors have no place.
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(2) The 'hijacking' of the consultation to discuss matters which the patient has not raised is presumptive and unwarranted.
(3) Ifsuch matters are discussed, this must be done by the presentation of information in an impartial manner. It infringes patient autonomy for the doctor to attempt to convince a patient of a particular viewpoint.
The doctor/patient relationship What may be considered acceptable behaviour for a doctor depends ultimately on what we believe about the doctor/patient relationship. Therefore, in order to decide whether these criticisms are valid, the ethical basis needs to be determined.
One option may be called the pastoral model. This assumes that doctors are, in some way, charged with a responsibility for their patients' health, just as a priest traditionally has a cure of souls, or perhaps an army officer is responsible for the men under his command. This paternalist model does seem to reflect the relationship some general practitioners have with their patients and some of our concepts of doctors' activities (for example, when we speak of 'doctor's orders'). However, although this model may once have governed general practice, it is a theory that, like the Divine Right of Kings, has had its day.
A second model, which seems to be favoured by an improbable alliance ofright-wing market economists and left-wing advocates ofpatients' rights, is the consumerist model. Here doctors are no different from plumbers or grocersthey provide a service which patients call upon as and when they think fit. It is this model which seems to underly the criticisms ofhealth education outlined above. Although it may have its merits, it does not adequately describe the behaviour and expectations of doctors or patients, nor does it explain the organization of the National Health Service.
A more attractive option is an implicit contract model. This assumes that a doctor's reponsibilities depend on what society expects doctors to doupon a contract whose terms are not explicit but which can be put into operation by surveying people's expectations and beliefs and by the terms of statutes and regulations. This model has been proposed by several authors" , and used by Kennedy"2, for example, to provide a solution to the problem of under-age contraception. One document which seems to provide strong support for such a hypothesis for general practice is the Terms and Conditions of Service13, in which one famous passage defines the duties of general practitioners as providing 'those services normally provided by general practitioners'surely one of the smallest circular arguments on record! This circularity is only tolerable if we can operationally define such services as those which patients on the whole expect, and doctors on the whole are prepared to provide.
Prevention and autonomy reconciled? The three difficulties with 'opportunistic' prevention can to a large extent be overcome if we accept the 'implicit contract' model, although the arguments raised do suggest certain areas where caution is needed.
The shift in philosophy of general practice is only unacceptable if it is doctors alone, and not society at large, who have changed the rules of the contract.
Although no one appears to have surveyed this question in precisely these terms, the evidence seems to indicate that this change is generally acceptable to society. For example, the Government pays doctors specifically to perform cervical smears and immunizations. Cartwright"4 found that 78% of patients would like a regular check-up, and two-thirds ofthese wanted their general practitioners to offer this service.
Perhaps we can push the contract analogy further. The prudent owner of high-technology equipment does not wait for it to go wrong and then call in an engineer; he pays for a maintenance contract which provides emergency repairs when something goes wrong (including out-of-hours service). Most companies also offer regular preventive maintenance servicing. Perhaps what we have done is decided to expect for ourselves as good a standard of care and maintenance as we get for our cars or our computers.
Under this model, is the use of the consultation to discuss matters which the patient has not raised a presumptive, unwarranted, and paternalistic 'hijacking', or does it indicate a 'jacking-up' of standards of care?
Certainly, to seek to maximize our patients' health implies that we know what this isit implies values. But having a set of values and acting on them does not necessitate imposing them on others or overriding their freedom. As Brody"5 has pointed out, just because a course has been recommended by a doctor, this does not mean that a patient who follows it is not acting freely and authentically.
This does not imply that doctors can use any tactics they like in promoting prevention. Given the contract model, doctors are only justified in opportunistic intervention so long as this is part ofthe implicit contract, and there are limits to the action that may be permissible. For example: (1) One may not make treatment contingent on behaviour change, e.g. giving antibiotics for bronchitis only if the patient stops smoking (although some doctors do on occasions adopt this sort of wellmeaning blackmail).
(2) Demands rising from the patient must always take precedence over the doctor's preventive priorities. Fortunately, pragmatism and ethics coincide here, since health education is highly unlikely to be successful ifthe patient has other more pressing concerns.
(3) The propaganda must not be idiosyncratic. If the doctor's role is defined by a social consensus, then doctors must abide by this consensus and not deviate too far from it. On this basis, anti-smoking advice is clearly acceptable since it is universally agreed that smoking is a health hazard. The case for dietary advice is not so clear since the consensus is less secure, though probably sufficient to justify action. On the other hand, it would be inappropriate to use consultations and the power doctors have therein to convert patients to a different religious view, even though the doctor might sincerely believe that it would promote their health and wellbeing. The roles of the doctor and the missionary are different and must be separated.
We can, of course, under this model test these and any other constraints by empirical studies ofpeoples' expectations.
Finally, the model deals with the anxieties ofthose who feel that the doctor should lay the choices before the patient as objectively as possible. This theory has been developed in relation to difficult choices oftreatment option, such as mastectomy versus lumpectomy for breast cancer, when the choice is between uncertain outcomes, none of which is totally desirable and all of which are outside the patient's experience. The choice is between various ways of being ill, rather than between illness and health. Whilst it is reasonable to expect a doctor to be impartial in such situations, it is surely unreasonable and outside society's concept of the doctor's role to expect him or her to pretend to be neutral between behaviours likely to lead either to health or to illness. Of course, the patient must be allowed the right to dissent. This is freedom of choice, but doctors surely must be free to act as advocates ofhealth, and indeed are expected to do so.
In any case, the idea of doctors and patients relating to each other as pure intellectsthe doctor laying out the arguments and the patient making a free and informed decisionis a fantasy ofeighteenth-century rationalism. What, for example, about patients who want to be treated paternalistically? Giving up smoking is hard, and many people seem to find that a blunt statement from their doctor that they should do so, stimulates their own resolve. In such situations, perhaps short-term voluntary paternalism may increase longer-term autonomy, as Brody"5 has argued.
It seems unlikely that our patients' autonomy is such a fragile flower that a doctor can swamp it merely by expressing an opinion. Certainly, the patients in Russell's10 study were not so easily led -95% proved strong enough to resist their doctor's exhortations! The remaining 5% probably consisted not of those too weak-willed to disobey the doctor, but of those sufficiently autonomous to make use of their doctor's encouragement to do something they wished to do.
Conclusion
In their laudable enthusiasm to improve health, the proponents of opportunistic intervention have overlooked the ethical implications. Nevertheless, many of the criticisms are based on inadequate models of the doctor/patient relationship. Given the necessary safeguards (the details of which this paper only begins to define), opportunistic health education seems likely to benefit patients' health without destroying either their happiness or their autonomy.
